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CIVIL PROCEDURE - DELAY FOR FILING APPLICATIONS FOR
REHEARINGS IN COURTS OF APPEAL
On March 15, 1962, the day after judgment was rendered,
the clerk of court for the First Circuit Court of Appeal mailed
copies of judgment to counsel of record who received them on
March 16. Counsel's application for rehearing was mailed on
March 29, and was received by the court on March 30. The ap-
plication was denied under Rule XI, Section 1, of the Uniform
Rules for the Courts of Appeal' because received by the court
more than fourteen days after notice of judgment was mailed. 2
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed. Held,
under the Louisiana Constitution the delay for filing an applica-
tion for rehearing in the courts of appeal may not commence
until the date counsel receives notice of judgment. Thus, Rule
XI, Section 1, of the Uniform Rules for the Courts of Appeal is
unconstitutional insofar as it provides the delay commences upon
the date of mailing the notice of judgment. Wantless v. Louisi-
ana Real Estate Board, 147 So. 2d 395 (La. 1962).
Determination of the date upon which the time for filing an
application for rehearing in the courts of appeal commences to
run necessitates examination of several sources. Prior to amend-
ment in 1958, s Article VII, Section 24, of the State Constitution
provided in part:
"Notice of all judgments [of courts of appeal] shall be given
to counsel of record; and the court shall provide by rule for
the giving of such notices. No delay shall run until such no-
tice shall have been given."
The 1958 amendment to Article VII deleted the last sentence
of Section 25.4 In 1960, however, Article 2166 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was enacted to provide:
"In the courts of appeal the delay for applying for a rehear-
1. "Applications for rehearing must be filed . . . on or before the fourteenth
calendar day after (but not including) the date of such delivery in person or
by deposit in the U.S. mail, and no extension of time shall be granted." Uniform
Rules of the Courts of Appeal XI, § 1, in 8 LA. R.S. ANN. 70, 75 (West, Supp.
1961).
2. Wanless v. Louisiana Real Estate Board, 140 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1962).
3. La. Acts 1958, No. 561.
4. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 24, as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 561: "Notice of
all judgments shall be given to counsel of record; and the courts shall provide by
rule for the giving of such notice."
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ing commences to run the day after notice of judgment has
been given by the court to counsel of record in the case.""
Further, R.S. 13:4446 presently reads:
"[A] pplications for rehearings in . courts of appeal must
be filed on or before the fourteenth calendar day after no-
tice of judgment has been given, as required by Article VII,
Section 24, of the Constitution.""
Pursuant to the constitutional directive, Rule XI, Section 1, of
the Uniform Rules for the Courts of Appeal now provides for
the giving of notice as follows:
"[Applications for rehearings] must be filed . . . on or be-
fore the fourteenth calendar day after (but not including)
the date of ... delivery in person or by deposit in the U.S.
mails [of the notice of judgment] .1'7
Opposite results might be obtained in interpretation of these
procedural provisions depending upon the analysis used. One
analysis assumes that the 1958 constitutional amendment was
intended to allow the legislature, if it saw fit, to provide for a
different time for the commencement of the delay for rehearing
applications. The legislature apparently did not intend to exer-
cise its constitutionally granted prerogative for it used the iden-
tical word - "given" - in subsequently enacted statutes." Since
the term "given" as used in the constitutional provision prior to
1958 had been construed to require actual receipt of notice,9 a
5. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2166 (1960). The official revision com-
ments following this article list as its source: "Former R.S. 13:4446; La. Su-
preme Court Rule XII, sec. 1; Const. Art. VII, sec. 24."
6. LA. R.S. 13:4446 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 38, § 1.
7. Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal XI, § 1, in 8 LA. R.S. ANN. 70, 75
(West, Supp. 1961).
8. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2166 (1960) ; LA, R.S. 13:4446 (1950),
as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 38, § 1.
9. Reeves v. Department of Highways, 228 La. 653, 83 So. 2d 889 (1955)
Mid-State Tile Co. v. Chaudoir, 228 La. 634, 83 So. 2d 654 (1955) ; O.K. Realty
Co. v. John A. Juliani, Inc., 157 La. 277, 102 So. 399 (1924) ; Morning Star
Baptist Church v. Martina, 150 La. 951, 91 So. 404 (1922) ; Soileau v. Manuel,
109 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; Newsom v. Caldwell & McCann, 51
So. 2d 393 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Gomez v. Broussard, 35 So. 2d 477 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1948) ; Martin v. Huff Truck Lines, 32 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1947) ; Kond v. Royalty Indem. Co., 24 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) ;
Matthew v. Spears, 24 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) ; Ridgdell v. Tangi-
pahoa Parish School Board, 17 So. 2d 386 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944) ; Tyson v.
Baker, 12 So. 2d 468 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943) ; Thompson v. Leach & McClain,
11 So. 2d 925 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943) ; Lacaze v. Hardee, 7 So. 2d 719 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1941) ; Dambly v. Duconge, 5 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941) ;
Murray v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 184 So. 413 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938). Contra,
Lovelace v. Gowan, 52 So. 2d 97 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951) ; Polizzi v. Thibodaux,
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like construction should follow today. Under this view, it fol-
lows that the Uniform Rule's provision that the delay may com-
mence upon mailing of notice is an exercise of authority granted
by the Constitution to the legislature, and conflicts with the
legislative provisions enacted pursuant to that power.
A contrary analysis assumes the 1958 constitutional amend-
ment intended to delegate authority to the courts of appeal to
"provide by rule" for the commencement of the delay. Admit-
tedly, Article 2166 of the Code of Civil Procedure seemingly
codified the "delay" provision deleted from the Constitution in
1958; however, R.S. 13:4446,10 which by specific statutory pro-
vision1 ' prevails over Article 2166,12 provides that determina-
tion of when notice has been given is to be found in the Con-
stitution. Since under this view the Constitution delegates power
to the courts of appeal, rather than to the legislature, to provide
for the commencement of the delay, ultimate determination of
when the delay commences is found in the Rule provided by the
courts of appeal.13 This analysis was apparently relied upon by
the drafters of the Uniform Rules for the Courts of Appeal; and
since adoption of these Rules in 1960, the courts of appeal have
uniformly held that the delay commences upon the court's mail-
ing the notice of judgment,14 not upon counsel's receipt.
37 So. 2d 62 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948) ; McCollister v. Police Jury of Sabine
Parish, 197 So. 661 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
10. LA. R.S. 13:4446 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 38, § 1.
11. La. Acts 1960, No. 15, § 5; Robertson v. Great American Indem. Co., 136
So. 2d 550, 556 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
12. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2166 (1960).
13. Strength is given this view by a further assumption that the mentioned
amendment intended to change the former law. See note 18 infra, and material
cited therein.
14. Moreau v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 692 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962) ; Jefferson v. Jefferson, 145 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ;
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Town of Washington, 143 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962) ; Thibodeaux v. Kern, 143 So. 2d 422 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Hulin
v. Hale, 137 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Lewis v. Bell, 137 So. 2d 706
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Friedman, 137 So. 2d
700 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Robertson v. Great American Indem. Co., 136 So. 2d
550 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Bailey v. Haymon, 129 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1961); Guarisco Const. Co. v. Talley, 126 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961).
The drafters of the Uniform Rule had precedent on their side in choosing
mailing as the beginning of their delay. The following Louisiana procedural stat-
utes provide for the giving or service of notice by mail, effective as of the date
of mailing: LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 1914 (rendition of interlocutory
judgments), 1975 (delay to apply for a new trial), 2087 (delay to take a devolu-
tive appeal), and 2123 (delay to take a suspensive appeal). Moreover, the Rules
of the Supreme Court, rule XII, § 1, as amended in 1954, in 8 LA. R.S. ANN. 60
(West, Supp. 1961) provides that the commencement of the delay for rehearing
applications in the Supreme Court is upon rendition of judgment. See also Sanders
v. Flowers, 218 La. 472, 496, 49 So. 2d 858, 866 (1950) (notice by newspaper pub-
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It seems that both analyses have merit and that Wanless
could have been resolved by application of either. 15 However,
since the court based its decision upon an interpretation of the
term "given" without mentioning the intention of the 1958 con-
stitutional amendment, 6 it apparently assumed the amendment
was not intended to change the law in any respect. 7 Since
amendments are generally presumed to have intended some
change in the former law,' 8 it is submitted that the Wanless de-
cision could have been based on more solid reasoning by using
one of the suggested analyses.
lication valid; personal receipt of notice unnecessary under Louisiana Conserva-
tion Statute, LA. R.S. 30:6B (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 489, § 1).
15. E.g., a court rule contravening a procedural statute has been invalidated.
State ex rel. Tebault v. Judges of Fifth Circuit, 37 La. Ann. 596 (1885). Of.
Louisiana ex rel. Tooreau v. Posey, 17 La. Ann. 252 (1865). When found to have
been adopted under constitutional authority, however, the court rule has prevailed.
Brott v. New Orleans Land Co., 156 La. 807, 101 So. 150 (1924). Cf. Douglas
Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74 So. 2d 182 (1954).
16. The court cited WEBSTER, NEW WORLD DICTIONA IY (College ed.), which de-
fines "deliver" as "to give up; give or hand over; to give out; distribute; as deliver
the mail." 147 So. at 399. Noteworthy, however, is that WEBSTER, UNABRIDGED
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1060 (2d ed. 1959) defines "give" as meaning
not only "to deliver" but also "to cause to have delivered." Further, both 38
C.J.S. Give 926 (1943) and FUNK & WAGNALLS, HANDBOOK OF SYNONYMS 220
(rev. ed. 1947) define "give" as a "term of such general import as to be a syn-
onym for a wide variety of words." RODALE, THE SYNONYM FINDER 460 (1961)
defines "give" as meaning not only "to deliver" but also "to issue; for example,
the giving of notice may mean 'the issuing of notice,' as well as the 'delivering of
notice.' "
In determining that "given" meant "actual delivery" the court cited Baldwin
v. Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Rapid Motor
Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 134 Conn. 235, 56 A.2d 519 (1947) ; Selken v. Northland Ins.
Co., 299 Iowa 1046, 90 N.W.2d 29 (1958). To the contrary, though not mentioned
by the court, are Petition of Boyajian, 310 Mass. 822, 38 N.E.2d 336 (1941)
Stanton v. Hawkins, 41 R.I. 501, 103 Atl. 229 (1918).
17. The court quoted from Mid-State Tile Co. v. Chaudoir, 228 La. 634, 83
So. 2d 654 (1955) which interpreted LA. CONST. art. VII, § 24, prior to its 1958
amendment and LA. R.S. 13:4446 (1950) prior to its 1960 amendment, and then
reaffirmed that case, despite the mentioned amendments. Wanless v. Louisiana
Real Estate Board, 147 So. 2d 395, 400, 401 (La. 1962). Further, since there is
no provision in the present Article VII, § 24, of the Constitution prescribing when
the delay commences to run, it seems the court construed the provision as it read
prior to the amendment, i.e., as if it included the clause "no delay shall run until
such notice shall have been given."
18. Succession of Thomson, 221 La. 791, 798, 60 So. 2d 411, 414 (1952) held
that "where the legislature deliberately amends an act ...the courts are not au-
thorized to ascribe a meaning at variance with the plain import of the language
used, as that would be exercising legislative functions and would in effect operate
as a judicial repeal." Further, Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 195
La. 43, 53, 196 So. 15, 18 (1940) held that "the jurisprudence is well settled that,
when a statute (particularly one which has been interpreted by the courts) is
amended, and the wording of the act is altered, the Legislature intended to change
the former law on the subject." Likewise, 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 384b(2) 904-06
(1953) states that "it will be presumed that the legislature, in adopting an amend-
ment, intended to make some change in the existing law, and therefore the courts
will endeavor to give some effect to the amendment. So a change .. .will raise the
presumption that a change of meaning was also intended, as where material words
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The Wanless decision, by the addition of mailing time of the
notice of judgment, grants litigants a longer delay in which to
apply for rehearings in courts of appeal. 19 Also, no delay will
commence if the notice is lost through or delayed by miscarriage
of the mail. On the other hand, under the Uniform Rule ap-
proach, the commencement date is within control of the courts
for the important administrative purpose of allotting applica-
tions from each cycle of judgments to the judges who prepare
the recommendations for rehearing conferences. As this con-
trol has allowed immediate distribution of all applications with-
in each cycle at a predetermined date, final dispositions for each
cycle have been more promptly administered.
The instant case nullifies a rule considered by the courts of
appeal as "one of the more noteworthy changes in appellate
practice '20 effected by the 1960 constitutional reorganization of
the Louisiana appellate courts. Perhaps the Supreme Court will
reverse Wanless when shown the administrative necessity for
the Uniform Rule's provision ;21 however, if the court feels bound
by its prior jurisprudential interpretation of the term "given,"
the reversal may have to be accomplished by amendment to Ar-
ticle VII, Section 24, of the Constitution allowing the delay to
commence prior to the "giving" of notice.22 If the 1958 consti-
contained in the original act are omitted from the amendatory act." (Emphasis
added.) See also United States v. Bashaw, 152 U.S. 436 (1894).
19. Hence, distance of parties from the court will not be a factor in the time
counsel actually have for preparation of rehearing briefs and arguments.20. Hulin v. Hale, 137 So. 2d 709, 715 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Interstate
Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Friedman, 137 So. 2d 700, 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962);
Robertson v. Great American Indem. Co., 136 So. 2d 550, 556 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962) ; Bailey v. Harmon, 129 So. 2d 203, 206 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). See
Tate, Proceedings in Appellate Courts, 35 TUL. L. REv. 585, 593-95 (1961).
21. The following cases have followed Wanless. Nipper v. Ferguson, 148 So. 2d
316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; In re Berry, 148 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963) ; Jones v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 148 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963). However, in Jefferson v. Jefferson, 145 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962) the Supreme Court has ordered the judges of the Third Circuit to show
cause on or before March 25, 1963, why the rehearing was not granted when ap-
plication therefor was received by the court within fourteen days from counsel's
receipt but not within fourteen days of mailing the notice of judgment. If the
court feels it was incorrect in Vanless, this case presents an excellent opportunity
for reversal.
22. In Wanless the clerk of court mailed the judgment to counsel of record
one day earlier than anticipated; hence the date of March 16, 1962, appeared on
the notice attached to the judgment, even though notice was mailed on March 15.
As a consequence, relators also contended the delay commenced on March 16 be-
cause the notice itself was so dated. 147 So. 2d at 398. It is submitted that the
court could have accepted this contention and found the application timely with-
out passing upon the validity of the Uniform Rule. Since the court apparently
chose to cast the contention aside without ruling thereon and to base its decision
.upon an interpretation of the term "given," it is submitted the court went out of
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tutional amendment was actually intended to give the courts of
appeal authority to adopt a rule for the commencement of the
delay prior to the actual receipt of notice, it was unfortunate
that the Constitution retained, and subsequent legislation em-
ployed, the term "given."
So long as Wanless retains its vitality, the criteria formerly
utilized to determine receipt of notice will apparently again be
applicable. Generally, notice of judgment will be sent by regis-
tered or certified mail; thus, the delay for filing an application
for rehearing will begin on the date the return card was
signed.23 In order to be effective, a return receipt must be
signed either by the addressee or his authorized agent.2 4 The
return receipt will be received as evidence of actual receipt by
counsel of record unless it is proved the person signing was with-
out authority to receive and receipt for the notice. 25 Further,
notice addressed to a counsel participating in the case, though
not counsel of record, will suffice.2 Finally, as the judgment of
a court of appeal becomes final and executory upon expiration
of the delay for rehearing without application therefor being
filed,27 the exact date of the delay's expiration28 is of primary
its way to pass upon the validity of the rule; hence the decision may stand until
legislatively overruled.
23. Matthews v. Spears, 24 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) ; McCaskey
Register Co. v. Lumpkin, 197 So. 640 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
24. See note 23 supra.
25. Matthews v. Spears, 24 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) ; Ridgdell v.
Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 17 So. 2d 386 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944; Mc-
Caskey Register Co. v. Lumpkin, 197 So. 640 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
26. Ridgdell v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 17 So. 2d 386 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1944) (notice given assistant district attorney sufficient where district attor.
ney's name appeared as counsel of record).
27. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2167 (1960).
28. The date of filing is the day the application is delivered to actual custody
of the court. Nipper v. Ferguson, 148 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; In re
Berry, 148 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; Jones v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 148 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; State v. Lumpkin, 147 So. 2d
80 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); King v. McCoy Bros. Lumber Co., 147 So. 2d 77
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Funderburk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d
710 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Moreau v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 146
So. 2d 692 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Jefferson v. Jefferson, 145 So. 2d 356 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Town of Washington, 143 So. 2d
613 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Thibodeaux v. Kern, 143 So. 2d 422 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962) ; Hulin v. Hale, 137 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Lewis v.
Bell, 137 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v.
Friedman, 137 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Robertson v. Great American
Indem. Co., 136 So. 2d 550 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Genovese v. Abernathy, 135
So. 2d 802 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Harper v. Borden Co., 129 So. 2d 330 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Bailey v. Haymond, 129 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ;
Guarisco Constr. Co. v. Talley, 126 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; McGee
v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 125 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960).
If the last day of the delay falls on a legal holiday, the application may be filed
the following day. LA. R.S. 13:4446(C) (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 38,
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importance to litigants. Henceforth, action to be taken upon
final and executory judgments of the courts of appeal must be
preceded by careful examination of the time the notices of judg-
ment were received by counsel of record, with the above rules
in mind.
H. F. Sockrider, Jr.
CIVIL PROCEDURE - DISCOVERY - ORAL EXAMINATION
OF OPPONENT'S EXPERT WITNESS
The state expropriated defendant's property for an amount
certified by two licensed realtors to be just compensation.' Be-
fore trial contesting the appraised fair market value of the
property, defendant sought by oral deposition to determine the
manner in which one realtor arrived at his valuation. The real-
tor testified he could not remember without referring to his
notes, which counsel for the state had instructed him not to do.
Subsequently, on the trial of a rule to show cause why he should
not answer all questions, the court ordered the realtor to consult
whatever material he planned to use upon trial of the case and
to answer questions in regard to facts upon which he based his
appraisal. The state contended this order violated Louisiana
§ 1; id. 1:55, as amended, La. Acts 1956, No. 549, provides that the following days
are legal holidays all over the state: Sundays; January 1; January 8; January
19; February 22; May 30; June 3; July 4; August 30; Labor Day (1st Monday
in September) ; November 1; November 11; Thanksgiving Day (4th Thursday in
November) ; Christmas Day; Inauguration Day in Baton Rouge. For cases in-
volving the question of legal holidays, see Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Fried-
man, 137 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (February 12, Lincoln's Birthday,
held not a legal holiday) ; Hulin v. Hale, 137 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
(same) ; Genovese v. Abernathy, 135 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (Christ-
mas is a legal holiday) ; Guarisco Constr. Co. v. Talley, 126 So. 2d 793 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961) (same) ; McGee v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 125
So. 2d 787 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960) (Sunday is a legal holiday).
Further, courts of appeal are without authority to grant additional time for
the application (Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal XI, § 1, in LA. R.S. ANN.
70, 75 (West, Supp. 1961) ; Gautreaux v. Harang, 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349
(1938) ; Kelley v. Ozone Tung Coop., 38 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948)),
even though the untimeliness is due solely to a miscarriage of the mails (McGee
v. Southern Farm Cas. Ins. Co., 125 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1900)), a
party's change in attorneys (Clark v. Delta Tank Mfg. Co., 22 So. 2d 135 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1945)), or a secretary's misinterpretation of the attorney's instruc-
tions (Clostio's Heirs v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 37 So.2d 44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948)).
1. LA. R.S. 48:441-460 (Supp. 1962). The procedure is basically the follow-
ing: amount of money estimated to be just and adequate is paid into registry of
court; ex parte order issued declaring property has been taken for highway pur-
poses; title vests in state when money deposited; defendant must contest within
ten days, or every claim waived except claims for compensation; defendant has
the burden of proof in establishing any market value other than the one alleged
by the state.
